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Accounting for Cost of Naval Vessels under
Cost-Plus-Profit Contracts*
By Francis P. Farquhar

Early in 1917, when it became apparent that the United States
would enter the world war, the navy department foresaw that a
rapid expansion and increase in speed would be required in its
construction programme. There were at that time numbers of
contracts for destroyers, battleships and battle cruisers let on the
usual fixed price basis, but upon which work had not been begun.
The problem before the navy department and the shipbuilders was
how to carry out these contracts under conditions that would
inevitably result in greatly increased cost. Moreover, the new
conditions called for a large addition to the construction pro
gramme which meant filling up all the available shipyards with
work to capacity. This precluded any possibility of using the
customary method of submitting plans for competitive bids.
Conferences between the navy department and the shipbuilders
resulted in the adoption of the cost-plus-profit plan of payment.
There were no precedents for contracts of this character on any
thing like the magnitude of the scale required. The nearest anal
ogies that existed were certain manufacturing contracts based on
actual cost plus a percentage for profit. Time was limited and
necessity was urgent, so this form was adopted as the best avail
able.
The definition of cost was only briefly considered in the con
tracts. It was fairly obvious as far as direct labor and materials
were concerned, but the accounting for overhead, as usual, pre
sented difficulties. Some of the shipbuilders proposed a fixed
percentage of the labor and materials costs as the basis for over
head; others a fixed percentage of the direct labor cost; while
others suggested actual overhead as shown by the books.
The first two plans were abandoned as being too indefinite and
also because the normal percentages of overhead varied widely
in the different shipyards. The contracts were finally drawn up
on the basis of actual cost of labor, material and overhead. The
‘A thesis presented at the May, 1919, examinations of the American Institute of
Accountants.
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percentage for profit was agreed upon in every case as 10% of
the total cost, excluding from this cost any sums that might be
paid by the navy department for increased plant facilities. A
number of these cost-plus-10% contracts were signed by the navy
department and the various shipbuilders during the spring and
early summer of 1917.
As work proceeded, it became increasingly apparent that the
cost-plus-percentage basis had certain defects which rendered
these contracts not the most desirable type. It was impracticable
to change the existing contracts, but when it became necessary
later in the summer to place a large number of additional orders
for destroyers, a new type of contract was evolved, which, while
adhering to the principle of actual cost, did away with the per
centage basis for profit by substituting a fixed profit with a bonus
for saving in cost below an estimated figure.
Almost all the naval construction undertaken during the
period of the war was on the basis of these two types of con
tracts. There were a few exceptions in special cases, but these
were relatively unimportant. It should be borne in mind that
these contracts were prepared under most difficult conditions and
were the result rather of urgent necessity than of desirable policy.
In looking back in the light of subsequent knowledge, it is very
easy to find ways in which they could have been improved. It is
not the purpose of this article, however, to criticize these con
tracts or to point out their defects, but rather, accepting them as
they stand, to describe some of the problems involved in ad
ministering the accounting and inspection required for the deter
mination of actual cost and the approval of bills.
Conditions of Cost Inspection

Approximately the same problems of determining actual cost
were involved in each type, the differences being in the basis of
profit and in the manner of providing for additional plant facili
ties. In most cases work on these two types of contracts was
carried on simultaneously in the same yard under practically iden
tical conditions. Of course, in the early part of the period the
work was largely on the cost-plus-10% basis, while latterly it
became greater on the cost-plus-fixed-profit basis. This involved
certain special problems in the control of the costs, but did not
affect the principles of determining them.
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To describe fully the conditions under which these contracts
were operated or even to enumerate all the problems arising from
them would be far beyond the scope of a brief article, but in order
that some idea of their nature and extent may be perceived a
brief summary of typical conditions is presented.
When the war began in the spring of 1917 there were under
construction in certain of the shipyards specializing in navy work
several vessels for private owners as well as several naval vessels
on the original fixed price contracts. In some plants a certain
portion of the facilities was also devoted to ship repair work.
To this was now added the work under cost-plus-percentage
contracts, which increased rapidly in proportionate volume as
time went on.
The first problem that arose was to see that work performed
on the fixed price contracts was not charged to the navy costplus contracts. The solution of this problem soon became con
tingent upon the solution of many other problems of detail.
The question of what should be classed as direct labor and
what as indirect arose almost immediately. It would obviously
be unfair to charge foremen’s time on fixed-price contracts to
indirect expense while charging it on cost-plus contracts directly
to the contracts. It should either be charged in both cases to
indirect or in both cases to direct expense. The latter would, of
course, be satisfactory only in case the correct charge were ascer
tainable. It was soon apparent, however, that in many cases
such expenses could not be properly allocated directly to specific
jobs, and it became necessary to consider all the doubtful cases
as indirect expense and to draw up rigid directions for exclud
ing such expenses from direct costs.
Another problem occurred in the charging of material. This
was a question of organization rather than of principle. With a
rapidly increasing volume of work, it was very difficult to be sure
that material purchased and charged to a particular vessel was
actually used on such a vessel. The stores and material account
ing facilities for most shipbuilders prior to this time were ade
quate perhaps for their own purposes, but with enormous in
crease in volume of material handled a state of confusion not
unnaturally resulted, from which it took many months of pains
taking effort to restore order and accurate accounting.
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As time went on the fixed price contracts became completed
and most of the work in the yards was on the navy cost-plus con
tracts, with a small amount of repair work and in some instances
a few contracts for the Emergency Fleet Corporation. The last
were also usually on cost-plus contracts differing slightly in form
from those of the navy. This condition made it still more im
portant to provide for a correct segregation of costs between the
various contracts. It was obviously to the interests of the ship
builder that the cost-plus-percentage contracts should bear their
full costs without any diminution, and, as a matter of fact, a dis
honest shipbuilder might have been tempted to throw costs prop
erly belonging to other contracts on these cost-plus-percentage con
tracts. While it is not desired to express the slightest intima
tion that any shipbuilder wilfully diverted his costs in such a
way, it must, nevertheless, be apparent that there was a wide
opportunity for errors to creep in at the expense of the govern
ment. The proper segregation of charges between the contracts
became, therefore, one of the fundamental points in which the
government was interested.
As an illustration of the difficulty of carrying out this segrega
tion, even with the best intentions on the part of all concerned.
one need only to examine the processes entering into the build
ing of a vessel. One not familiar with a shipyard might suppose
that a vessel was a unit large enough to be kept entirely segre
gated from any other work. A great deal of the work on a vessel,
however, is done before the material actually reaches the building
slips. All the enormous fabricating and subsidiary shops, such
as the machine shop, the boiler shop, the sheet metal shop, the
pattern shop, the foundry, the galvanizing plant and others, con
tribute to the shipbuilding process; and, with these shops crowded
to the utmost limits of their capacity, it is often no easy matter
to keep track of the material destined for individual vessels.
Add to this the fact that drillers and rivet gangs are repeatedly
taken from one hull and sent to another perhaps only a few yards
away, and it will be seen that constant watchfulness is required
on the part of the time-keepers, shop clerks and inspectors to see
that the proper charges are made on the cost records.
Another condition that tended to create uncertainties in the
costs was the constantly increasing dilution of the shipbuilder’s
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force with inexperienced men. At times an enormous number of
labor job tickets would come through with erroneous charges,
which investigation proved were due simply to the ignorance of
the men or their unfamiliarity with conditions. It sometimes
happened that the job numbers written on the time cards would
prove to be those used by the workman at another shipyard where
he had recently been working. In other cases purely fictitious
numbers would appear, and no amount of training and exhorta
tion seemed to produce satisfactory results during the period of
rapid expansion.
This condition could have been corrected much more rapidly if
the shipbuilder’s time-keeping and accounting forces had been
able to expand with the requisite efficiency. But here the serious
difficulty was encountered of getting competent help at a time
when large numbers were responding to the call of the army
and navy. Nor was it easy to obtain new men at anything less
than prohibitive rates. It would often occur that a man engaged
as a time-keeper would, in two or three weeks after becoming
familiar with the work in the plant, discover that he could make
double his wages by becoming a rivet holder. This meant an
other man added to the ranks of productive labor, but at the
same time more trouble for the accounting department. The
result of these circumstances was that for a considerable period
large percentages of erroneous charges came through to the cost
books and were rectified there only by the most strenuous efforts
on the part of the veterans of the accounting system, aided by
the close cooperation of the government inspectors.
These are only a few of the conditions that existed throughout
a considerable period of war-time work on cost-plus contracts.
The work of the shipbuilder’s accounting forces and of the navy
department’s cost inspection force cannot properly be judged
without making allowance for such extraordinary difficulties.
Methods of Cost Inspection

The methods of cost inspection could not be determined fully
in advance, but developed with the increasing volume of the
work and the recognition of the complexity of the problems in
volved. Even a brief summary of the rules and procedure laid
down for the navy cost inspection boards would require con
siderably more space than is here available. Varying conditions
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had to be met and ever changing problems encountered. The
work of determining costs naturally fell, however, into the main
divisions of (a) materials, (b) labor, (c) indirect expenses,
(d) additional plant facilities. In determining these costs, the
work of the technical inspectors of the navy, namely, the superin
tending constructor, the inspector of machinery and the civil
engineer, formed an important part, but one which was not pri
marily concerned with accounting. The description here may,
therefore, be limited to the work of the cost inspector’s office,
which was primarily the accounting office for the government.
Accounting for Materials
The cost inspection of materials begins with the approval of
the purchase order. Every purchase order issued by the ship
builder requires the approval of the navy technical inspector who
is concerned with that particular material. This approval takes
into consideration the price, the terms of delivery, the quality
and the necessity for the article. The technical inspector
naturally looks to the cost inspector for recommendation as to
the reasonableness of prices. Accordingly, on every purchase
order the cost inspector checks the prices by such data as he may
have at hand or be able to obtain from outside sources. It is,
therefore, necessary for him to keep a complete record of prices
obtained from previous invoices, from navy yard records, pub
lished price lists and trade journals.
The next step after approval of the purchase order is for the
cost inspector to file the order in such a way that when the
invoice is presented it can be quickly checked against the order, for
the purpose of determining that the invoice price is correct and
that the total quantities invoiced do not exceed the quantities
authorized on the purchase order. No invoices are passed by
the cost inspector for payment unless they are checked against
a properly authorized purchase order.
The procedure outlined refers to the purchase of materials
ordered directly for use in constructing the vessels. It is often
impossible, however, to determine the ultimate destination of
material that is required for the various fabricating processes
in the plant, although it may be known that all of this material
will be required for the navy contracts. In such cases, the same
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procedure is followed, but in addition an inventory is required
showing the disposition of material as it is expended and the
quantity remaining on hand.
A great deal of material is also required for purposes connected
with indirect expense. This is purchased by the shipbuilder
for his own account and is drawn from his stores by requisition.
As the values involved are often considerable it is incumbent
upon the cost inspector to check the prices of this material and
see that they are issued against the shop expense orders at actual
cost prices, which, in this case, are taken as the average prices
paid for the respective classes of material. A constant test is,
therefore, required of the store-keeper’s price records, which in
volves repeated checking of the general stores inventory.
Inasmuch as the shipbuilder is accountable for all of the mate
rial purchased, it is necessary for the cost inspector to keep bills
of material continually posted up to date in order to ascertain that
no excess amounts of material are ordered. If it were not for
these bills of material, it would be possible for serious errors to
occur that could not easily be detected. Materials ordered for
certain specific jobs might be diverted in part by the shop fore
man to fill up emergency orders upon which material was short.
If, through some error, the credit did not reach the navy account
it would result that the navy would be charged with material not
received. When the time came for using such material on the
navy vessels it would be missing and a new order would be made
by the shipbuilder which would result in a duplicate charge to
the navy account. By keeping track of every order issued on a
bill of material, however, the new order would show as an excess
quantity and an explanation would be required. It should not
be inferred from this that any deliberate attempt at duplicating
orders or diversion of materials is the practice of the shipbuilders,
but, when the enormous volume of work in some of the large
shipyards is considered, it will be seen that errors of this sort
might very easily occur in spite of the best of intentions.
Accounting for Labor Charges

Perhaps the most difficult part of cost inspection is the check
ing of the labor charges. This, at first, might seem to be the
easiest, and under normal conditions it might well be easy. But
under the abnormal conditions prevalent during the war period,
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only the most thoroughly organized and painstaking efforts on
the part of the cost inspectors have sufficed to reduce to a mini
mum the errors in this branch of the accounting. Some of the
difficulties have already been recounted, but perhaps the most
perplexing condition of all is in the piece-work counting. Dur
ing the early part of the period few shipyards had an established
piece-work schedule, and in almost all the yards such schedules
as did exist were subject to continual changes. This made it
difficult for the inspectors to find anything definite with which
to check. Until the inspectors themselves became thoroughly
familiar with the conditions of work it was often impossible for
them to determine whether the rates placed by the foremen
on the piece-work slips were reasonable or not. With the tre
mendous expansion of work it was only natural that the piece
work rate-setters should make mistakes and not infrequently
these mistakes produced large discrepancies, not always to the
disadvantage of the government. It should be mentioned that
as time went on this condition showed considerable improvement.
Without casting any reflections upon the integrity of the
large body of workmen and the piece-work counters in general,
it must be admitted that a considerable amount of wrong counting
took place in almost every yard. Piece-work counting at best
requires the utmost vigilance and care even when all parties are
disposed to be rigidly honest. The least carelessness will often
result in a large error in the count. In rivet counting, for in
stance, it is very easy to miss a number of rivets in the count.
The riveter knows this and it is only human nature that he should
try to offset it by counting in all the rivets he can claim as his
own. With inexperienced counters this not infrequently results
in duplicate counts. Proper organization and training of the
counters can overcome this to a great extent, but proper organiza
tion and training were not to be had during certain stages of
the work. A green counter is also likely to make this mistake:
he will turn in a count as for ⅞ inch rivets, when as a matter
of fact the size actually driven was ⅝ in. With rates at $5.50
per hundred for ⅞ inch, and $4.50 per hundred for
inch, it
will be readily seen that an error of this sort makes considerable
difference.
Illustrations of errors due solely to inexperience or careless
ness that can creep into the accounts through the labor records
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could be multiplied without end. Not all the sources of these
errors were discoverable from the start, but it can be said that
through the constant watchfulness and alert minds of some in
spectors who came in direct contact with the work a large per
centage was detected and the causes were removed.
Another source of error in the labor accounts, which gave
considerable trouble in some yards during the early stages, was
the success of some of the men in circumventing the methods of
checking in and out of the gate. It might be supposed that gate
checkings methods were sufficiently well known to prevent any
errors of this sort, but here again reference must be made to
the rapidity of expansion and inexperience of the shipbuilders’
gate forces. To inadequate physical facilities was added the
complication of numerous shifts and the practice of overtime
work. In the face of these conditions the gate check not infre
quently broken down to a considerable extent, often making it
possible for men to claim credit for work when they were not
actually present in the yard at all. This condition also showed
much improvement as time went on.
The following is an illustration of this sort—a method which
was fortunately discovered in time to prevent much abuse. It
was found at one plant that a man rated at six dollars a day
could hire a boy rated at three dollars a day to call out the higher
priced man’s number on entering the gate in the morning and
leaving at night. The result was that the six dollar a day man
was marked present on the muster rolls, although he turned in
no ticket for his work. At pay day, when he received no pay
for that day, he could claim that his job ticket must have been
lost, as he was present on that day. An investigation of the
muster rolls would apparently prove him in the right and upon
his statement that he worked on such and such a job, there could
be no other course than to grant him his pay. He could then split
up with the boy whom he had engaged. Of course, this was a
simple condition, but, like many others, it was actually worked
until it was discovered or until the shipbuilder’s gate force be
came adequate to handle the expansion of work. As an illustra
tion of the expansion of work it may be stated that at some of
the large shipyards the force increased over 400% within a year,
a large part of this increase coming within the period of a few
months.
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Interpretation of Contracts

In addition to what may be termed the external features of
cost inspection there arose a multitude of questions involving the
interpretation of the contract terms. The final authority in such
cases rests with the secretary of the navy who acts through a
board appointed by him and known as the compensation board.
In referring matters to the compensation board at Washington
it is incumbent upon the local cost inspection boards at the ship
yards to present arguments and data for guidance. This re
quires frequent conferences between the different inspectors and
between the navy officers and the representatives of the ship
builder. These conferences and the necessary investigations
comprise a considerable part of the work of cost inspection and
require constant alertness and continual reference to the prin
ciples of accounting as well as to those of law and engineering.
Auditing and Reports

The results of all the external inspections and the decisions
of the boards are ultimately reflected in the accounting records
of the shipbuilder. The navy cost inspector is responsible for
auditing the records and ascertaining the correctness of the bills
rendered by the shipbuilder. This amounts to a continuous audit
comprising nearly all the phases customary in public accounting
practice. The clerical accuracy of the bookkeeping must be
thoroughly tested; satisfactory vouchers must be seen in a suffi
cient number of instances to establish the authenticity of the
entries; authority for journal entries and all unusual items must
be made evident; the building up of summaries must be critically
examined; and, above all, the indirect expenses must be sub
mitted to the closest scrutiny as to both the nature of items and
the method of distribution.
As an aid in conducting this audit and for the purpose of
providing the navy department with data in support of the bills
rendered, it is necessary for the cost inspector to keep records
and summary books agreeing with the shipbuilder’s accounts.
These are not intended to duplicate the shipbuilder’s work, but
are rather a supplementary record. From these records reports
are rendered monthly to the navy department. It is in reliance
upon these records as a summary of his audit that the cost
inspector attaches his signature of approval to the bills.
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